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NOTES
State v. Gremillion: The Constitutional and Evidentiary
Elasticity of the Louisiana Residual Hearsay Exception in
Criminal Cases
I. FACTS
In State v. Gremillion the Louisiana Supreme Court turned to the
then recently-enacted Louisiana Code of Evidence' in an attempt to
reconcile constitutional and evidentiary standards regarding admissibility
of evidence that, although falling outside the exceptions to the rule
against hearsay, bears some quantum of reliability and necessity.
The defendant Gremillion was involved in a barroom altercation
with Dupuy, the former husband of Gremillion's companion, in which
Gremillion struck Dupuy, rendering him unconscious, and then stomped
on his chest and abdomen.2 Dupuy admitted himself to a hospital several
hours after the incident, and later died, allegedly from the beating
administered by Gremillion.
On trial for manslaughter, Gremillion sought to establish that Du-
puy's death was not the result of the injuries received at the bar. Rather,
Gremillion contended, Dupuy's demise was the direct result of the injuries
incurred during a beating, administered hours after the barroom alter-
cation, by Swain and Swain's two companions. Dupuy owed Swain
$800; the defendant contended that this debt motivated Swain to kill
Dupuy. To support his theory, Gremillion called Swain as a witness.
The evidence established that Swain and his two companions were present
at the bar the night of the incident, and that Dupuy had threatened
Swain.
Gremillion also attempted to elicit testimony from the police officer
who interrogated Dupuy at the hospital that Dupuy had described his
Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAW REviEw.
1. 1988 La. Acts No. 515.
2. State v. Gremillion, 542 So. 2d 1074, 1076 (La. 1989). The defendant, Gremillion,
claimed that he struck Dupuy after Dupuy threatened his life and reached into his coat
pocket as if to pull out a gun.
3. Id. at 1077. Swain had purchased an automobile from Dupuy for $800, but due
to a community property dispute between Dupuy and his former wife, he could not give
Swain the proper title. Although the car was returned to Dupuy, he had not yet returned
the $800 purchase price to Swain.
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attackers as "three white males." However, the State's hearsay objections
were sustained by the trial court.4 The jury convicted Gremillion of
manslaughter, and the third circuit court of appeal affirmed., The Louis-
iana Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 6 ruling that although Du-
puy's statement to the police officer describing his attackers as "three
white males" did not qualify under the res gestae, 7 excited utterance,'
dying declaration, 9 or business records 0 exceptions to the hearsay rule,
the statement was otherwise trustworthy and reliable. Thus, apparently
finding that the statement would be admissible under a residual exception,
if the Louisiana Code of Evidence had a residual exception applicable
in criminal cases," the supreme court concluded that failing to admit
the statement violated Gremillion's constitutional right to present a de-
fense.'2
II. SCOPE OF NOTE
The Louisiana Code of Evidence, unlike the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence, conspicuously lacks a residual hearsay exception applicable in
4. Id. at 1076. The state's objections came only after the police officer had related
Dupuy's statement regarding the description of his attackers. Nevertheless, the objection
was sustained, and the jury was later instructed to disregard the statement.
5. State v. Gremillion, 529 So. 2d 497 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
6. Gremillion, 542 So. 2d at 1074.
7. Id. at 1077. La. R.S. 15:447, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8, stated:
"Res gestae are events speaking for themselves under the immediate pressure of the
occurrence, through the instructive, impulsive and spontaneous words and acts of the
participants, and not the words of the participants when narrating the events. What forms
any part of the res gestae is always admissible in evidence." (Dupuy's statement was
made 19 hours after the incident and was thus too far removed to be considered part
of the res gestae.).
8. Id. "[T]he statement is also not admissible as an excited utterance since it was
made after Dupuy had time to contemplate the event, and not while he was still under
the influence of a startling event."
9. Id. "Dying declarations are admissible if made when the declarant is fully con-
scious of his condition and under a sense of impending death, after having abandoned
all hope or expectancy of recovery." The court concluded that Dupuy was not aware of
his impending death.
10. Id. at 1078. Although the statement was recorded by the police officer in the
course of his employment, "[tlhe contents of the report are based on hearsay, and are
not admissible as a business record."
11. La. Code Evid. art. 804B(6), the residual exception, is limited to civil cases while
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5), the federal residual exception, is applicable to civil and criminal
cases. Nevertheless, comment (d) to Article 804B(6) states that although the exception is
limited to civil cases, a similar result, as that authorized by the exception, may be mandated
in criminal cases by the right of compulsory process in certain circumstances.
12. Gremillion, 542 So. 2d at 1079. La. Const. art. 1, § 16 states, in pertinent part:
"An accused is entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, to compel
the attendance of witnesses, to present a defense, and to testify in his own behalf."
(emphasis added).
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this criminal case. The Gremillion court, however, ruled that testimony
that was not otherwise admissible under any of the hearsay exceptions
was nonetheless admissible as exculpatory evidence in this case. In ren-
dering the court's opinion, Chief Justice Dixon relied on three factors:
the supposed reliability and trustworthy nature of the statement, the
Louisiana Code of Evidence residual hearsay exception for civil cases,
Article 804B(6) and the comments thereto, and the accused's constitu-
tional right to present a defense.
The court's holding in Gremillion raises critical issues for future
criminal cases. First, what quantum of reliability and/or necessity must
be reached to admit evidence pursuant to Gremillion? Second, is the
standard of admissibility articulated in Gremillion based on evidentiary
standards, constitutional standards, or both? Finally, may Gremillion
be cited by the prosecution in a criminal case as authority for allowing
the introduction of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence that possesses
some measure of reliability and necessity? A discussion of these questions
and others resulting from the Gremillion decision form the scope of
this note.
This note will first present a brief historical overview of hearsay
and its codification by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Louisiana
Code of Evidence, focusing on the similarities and differences between
the respective residual exceptions. Next, the impact of the constitutional
right to present a defense upon evidentiary standards will be evaluated.
Specifically, it will be determined whether the threshold for admissibility
of "reliable" evidence is lower under constitutional standards than under
evidentiary exceptions. An analysis of the Gremillion decision and an
attempt to clarify the parameters of its holding in terms of evidentiary
and constitutional principles follows. Finally, the rationale for limiting
the Louisiana Code of Evidence residual exception to civil cases will be
examined in light of possible confrontation clause violations.
III. HEARSAY
A. Historical Overview
Although hearsay is the most frequently occurring evidentiary prob-
lem, 3 its frequency has not dulled its complexity. Characterized as the
"single most important evidentiary rule in American Common Law, ' 14
13. P. Rothstein, Federal Rules of Evidence: An Update 170 (1981) [hereinafter
Rothstein]. Hearsay encompasses more than 60% of the evidence questions raised at trial.
14. Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. Fla. L.
Rev. 207, 209 (1984) [hereinafter Lilly].
1990] 847 •
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the hearsay rule has given rise to innumerable definitions and criticisms. 5
Standing guard against the admission of evidence precategorized as
"unreliable," the hearsay rule recognizes that, lacking the declarant's
presence in court, the jury must grapple with evidence without benefit
of oath, demeanor, and cross-examination, and without the probative
value inherent in assessing the in-court declarant's perception, memory,
and narration.' 6 However, while the prohibition generally excludes un-
reliable evidence and thus safeguards the accused's Sixth Amendment
right to confront witnesses, 7 this same prohibition has a contrary effect
on the defendant's right to present a defense by denying admission of
evidence from which the jury might infer the defendant's innocence.
Historically, each of the hearsay exceptions has been based on the
reliability of the evidence, factoring in the necessity of its admission.
It is this correlative relationship between reliability (trustworthiness) and
necessity that is the cornerstone of the residual or omnibus hearsay
exception.S
B. The Residual Exception: Comparing and Contrasting the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the Louisiana Code of Evidence
The hearsay rule is phrased in terms of inadmissibility, with evidence
allowed only under delineated exclusions 9 and exceptions, 20 including a
15. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 438 So. 2d 1091 (La. 1983); Fed. R. Evid. 801(c);
La. Code Evid. art. 801C. See generally Imwinkelried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay
Exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 239,' 262 (1978)
[hereinafter Imwinkelried], in which he states, "Rather than ensuring extraordinary reli-
ability, the traditional exceptions permit the admission of hearsay of frankly dubious
reliability."
16. J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence Manual 14.01[01] (1988) [here-
inafter Weinstein, Evidence Manual]. See also J. Maguire, Evidence: Common Sense and
Common Law at 17 ff. (1947). Cross-examination permits the jury to determine the
witness' willingness and ability and thus assess sincerity, comprehension, communicative
skills, and perception.
17. U.S. Const. amend. VI. See State v. Thompson, 331 So. 2d 848, 849 (La. 1976),
where in addressing the admission of hearsay evidence, the Louisiana Supreme Court
stated, "The traditional exclusion of hearsay in Anglo-American jury trials is based upon
historic considerations of unreliability and of potential unfairness to an accused to permit
into evidence damaging out-of-court statements which cannot be tested as to their basis
in fact, or by cross-examination of the out-of-court declarant."
18. See Senate Committee on Judiciary, Fed. R. Evid., S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 18 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7051, 7065. See also
Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assoc. Co., Ltd., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961). For
other cases recognizing the admissibility of hearsay possessing the requisite necessity and
reliability but falling outside other exceptions, rendered prior to enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the Louisiana Code of Evidence, see Burley v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 319 So. 2d 334 (La. 1975); Francis I. duPont & Co. v. McMikle, 230 So.
2d 677 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Salley Grocer Co. v. Hartford Accident and Idem. Co.,
223 So. 2d 5 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
19. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(l)-(2); La. Code Evid. art. 801D(1)-(4).
20. The Federal Rules of Evidence have 27 exceptions: 803(l)-(23), 804(b)(1)-(4), and
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residual category. Both the federal and Louisiana courts, under their
respective rules of evidence, lack authority to create hearsay exceptions
beyond those enumerated, despite the frequent, although erroneous,
characterization of the residual exception as ,a "catch-all" category.2 '
The newly enacted Louisiana Code of Evidence is the first unified,
comprehensive approach to state evidentiary problems available to the
Louisiana bar and bench. 2 The Code is based substantially on prior
Louisiana case law and statutes, as well as the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. 23 Louisiana courts, however, are bound neither by the federal
courts' interpretations of the Federal Rules nor by prior statutory in-
terpretations rendered by Louisiana courts. 24
The redactors of the Louisiana Code of Evidence deviated from the
federal provisions on occasion. For the purpose of this note, the most
significant of these deviations was in the drafting of the residual ex-
ception. This author assumes that the differences in wording between
the federal and state residual exceptions are purposeful and warrant
careful consideration in comparison and interpretation.
Generally, the codification of the residual exceptions in the Federal
Rules of Evidence (the "Rules") represents a compromise between a
rigid exclusionary rule and a rule permitting admission of all hearsay
merely upon a showing of -unavailability of the declarant. 25 The Rules
maintain two residual exceptions, one in which availability of the de-
clarant is immaterial (803(24)), and one requiring a demonstration that
the declarant is unavailable (804(b)(5)). Both are applicable in criminal
and civil cases. The redactors of the Federal Rules clearly avoided a
distinction between the civil and criminal rules of evidence, apparently
believing that the provisions of the sixth amendment, as well as other
two residual exceptions, 803(24) and 804(b)(5). The Louisiana Code of Evidence has 29
exceptions: 803(l)-(24), 804B(1)-(5), and one residual exception, 804B(6).
21. See Rothstein, supra note 13, at 219. The author states, "The intention of the
rule as finally drafted was most assuredly not to catch 'all' or even 'most."' Rothstein
goes further to say that "Congress clearly meant to leave the vast majority of over-the-
back-fence or on-the-street or in-the-halls statements inadmissible hearsay." See also La.
Code Evid. art. 804B(6) comment (b) which states that "the exception is not to be used
to emasculate the hearsay rule, as its counterpart in the federal rules is sometimes said
to be employed."
22. See Pugh, Force, Rault, & Triche, The Louisiana Code of Evidence-A Retro-
spective and Prospective View, 49 La. L. Rev, 689 (1989) (a detailed history of the
codification of the Louisiana Code of Evidence), reprinted in G. Pugh, 'R. Force, G.
Rault, & K. Triche, Handbook on Louisiana Evidence Law (1989).
23. La. Code Evid. art. 101 comment (a).
24. La. Code Evid. art. 102 comment (a).
25. See Pugh, Foreword-Symposium, The Federal Rules of Evidence, 36 La. L.
Rev. 59 (1975), for a thorough account of the evolution of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
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provisions in the Rules, would provide adequate protection to the crim-
inal defendant. 26
In contrast, the sole residual exception in the Louisiana Code of
Evidence, 804B(6), is, on its face, limited to civil cases where the
declarant is unavailable. Thus the Louisiana residual exception is pur-
posefully narrower than its federal counterpart.2 7 The Louisiana Code
of Evidence, in which the redactors clearly articulate a preference for
live witness testimony, 2s is unique in this limitation on the residual
exception. 29
C. Elements of Admissibility Under the Residual Provisions
There is an obvious reluctance to allow the judiciary unlimited
discretion in the application of the hearsay exceptions. Otherwise, pre-
dictable rulings would fall prey to extensive evidentiary uncertainties,
causing the failure of practitioners' strategic courtroom planning.30 For
hearsay evidence to be admissible under the residual exception, certain
prerequisites, aimed at assuring reliability and measuring necessity, must
be satisfied. These prerequisites differ markedly between the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the Louisiana Code of Evidence. 31
Federal Rule 804(b)(5) requires that, for testimony to be admitted,
the declarant be unavailable and that the statement possess circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the other hearsay exceptions
(804 (b) (1-4)).32 The statement must also: (a) be offered as evidence of
26. 4 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence 800[02] (1988).
27. La. Code Evid. art. 804B(6) comment (b).
28. 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 1 at Article 804B(6) original comment (f).
29. Eleven states adopted the Federal Rules' residual exceptions verbatim: Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Mississippi, New Mexico, Utah, West Virginia,
and Wyoming. Nevada adopted the version set forth in the 1969 Preliminary Draft of
the Rules. Nonsubstantive word changes were made by Nebraska, South Dakota, and
Hawaii, while the requirements regarding notice were varied in Minnesota, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Oregon. Delaware, finding the residual
exceptions repetitive, adopted only the Article 803(24) provision, and seven states-Florida,
Maine, Michigan, Ohio, Texas, Vermont, and Washington-chose not to enact any residual
exception. See generally G. Joseph, S. Saltzburg, & the Trial Evidence Committee of the
American Bar Association Section of Litigation, Evidence in America: The Federal Rules
in the States (1987) [hereinafter Joseph].
30. But see Rothstein, supra note 13, at 221, in which he states that "even under
the current limited version of the power [granted by the Federal Rules of Evidence), there
are widely divergent interpretations of its reach."
31. Of course, to be deemed admissible, hearsay evidence must not only satisfy the
requirements of the applicable residual exception but must also meet the criteria established
by the rules on relevancy, personal knowledge, authentication, best evidence, opinion, and
privilege.
32. See Joseph, supra note 29, at 85-90; see also Black, Federal Rules of Evidence
803(24) & 804(b)(5)-The Residual Exceptions-An Overview, 25 Hous. L. Rev, 13 (1988)
(factors the court will consider in assessing the trustworthiness of the statement).
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a material fact; (b) be more probative on the point in issue than other
evidence which could be procured through reasonable means; and (c)
serve the general purposes of the rules and the interests of justice.
Requirements (a)-(c) are thus essentially reiterations of both the require-
ment of relevancy and the general guidelines for interpretation of the
rules."
In drafting the Louisiana Code of Evidence, the redactors deemed
requirements (a) and (c) unhelpful and therefore deleted those provi-
sions .4 The redactors then restructured requirement (b), the requirement
of probative value, to "give greater guidance to the courts as to what
should be required for admissibility." 35 Specifically, the Louisiana pro-
vision requires that the proponent adduce or make a reasonable effort
to adduce "all other admissible evidence to establish the fact to which
the proffered statement relates."
The requirement of trustworthiness in the Louisiana Code of Evi-
dence imposes a more rigorous standard on litigants than its federal
counterpart.16 The Louisiana version is more stringent because trust-
worthiness is not demonstrated through the comparison to the other
enumerated hearsay exceptions, which exceptions vary enormously in the
guarantee of trustworthiness required for admission.3 7 Rather, under the
Louisiana Code of Evidence, the evidence must satisfy the requirement
of "trustworthiness" independent of any comparison with the hearsay
exceptions. Specifically, the Louisiana court must "consider all pertinent
circumstances in the particular case" and examine "matters both intrinsic
and extrinsic to the statement itself." 3 The Federal Rules only require,
at the least, the proof of a level of "trustworthiness" equivalent to the
lowest common denominator of the enumerated exceptions, and, at the
most, a "consensus average." 39
33. Joseph, supra note 29, at 85, 90. Requirement (a) is essentially a restatement of
the relevancy requirements found in Federal R. Evid. 401-412; requirement (c) is virtually
an identical requirement to that enunciated in Fed. R. Evid. 102.
34. 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 1 at Article 804B(6) original comment (e).
35. Id. at original comment (d).
36. Id. at original comment (c). "[Tlhis Subparagraph imposes a much more rigorous
trustworthiness requirement than its counterparts in the federal rules."
37. C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 324.1, at 908 (1984) [hereinafter
McCormick] ("the range in degree of trustworthiness among the specific exceptions is
admittedly considerable"). For an overview of the application of the Federal Rules' residual
exceptions see generally Imwinkelried, supra note 15; and Sonenshein, The Residual
Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 867 (1982).
38. 1988 La. Acts No. 515 at Article 804B(6) original comment (c).
39. McCormick, supra note 37, § 324.1, at 908.
1990]
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IV. STATE V. GREMILLION: HEARSAY AND THE CRIMINAL TRIAL
The redactors of the Louisiana Code of Evidence did not limit the
residual exception to civil cases in an attempt to make it more difficult
for a criminal defendant to introduce evidence in his favor. Rather, the
exception was limited to prevent prosecutors from introducing evidence
of dubious reliability against the defendant, possibly violating the de-
fendant's right to confrontation. The exception was also limited to
prevent courts from construing federal and state evidentiary rules in-
terchangeably and applying decisions under the former to the latter.
Regardless of the lack of a theoretical distinction between the com-
mon law rules of evidence in the criminal and civil trial, 4° the scope of
the hearsay exceptions are more restrictive in the criminal trial4l because
of the inherent differences in the goals of the criminal and civil pro-
ceedings. 42 Further, Louisiana's reluctance to admit hearsay falling out-
side an established hearsay exception recognizes that the reasons for
excluding hearsay are more critical in a criminal trial where the accused's
freedom, and possibly his life, are at stake, and where constitutional
concerns are paramount.
43
It is not surprising, therefore, that there are no reported cases in
Louisiana in which otherwise reliable evidence falling outside an estab-
lished exception was admitted under the residual exception against the
defendant in a criminal trial." But what about when that same evidence
40. Comment, Were the Louisiana Rules of Evidence Affected by the Adoption of
the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, 14 La. L. Rev. 568 (1954), reprinted in G.
Pugh, Louisiana Evidence (1974).
41. R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence 382 (1982) [here-
inafter Lempert]. Cf. id. at 382 n.49, stating,
In some cases it might be so unreasonable for a civil jury to base a judgment
on certain hearsay that the use of the evidence would violate the due process
clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendment. Thus, there might be constitutional
limitations on the admissibility of hearsay evidence even in civil cases.
42. For an explanation that the criminal trial is not so much a "truth-determining
process" as "a probability of guilt-determining process," see generally Pulaski, Criminal
Trials: A "Search for Truth" or Something Else?, 16 Crim. L. Bull. 41, 45 (1980). For
an overview of the critical differences in a criminal trial-including the factors resulting
from restrictions on discovery, the in-custody status of witnesses, the impact of the
exclusionary rules, the risk of prejudice to the accused and the confrontation clause-see
generally 4 J. Weinstein, supra note 26, at 1 800[04].
43. See, e.g., State v. Monroe, 345 So. 2d 1185, 1189 (La. 1977) ("In criminal trials
... the accused's constitutional rights to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him are of paramount concern.").
44. In what is the only mention of a residual exception in a criminal case prior to
the enactment of the Louisiana Code of Evidence, Justice Lemmon, who also authored
a concurring opinion in Gremillion, dissented in State v. Martin, voicing a reluctance to
admit hearsay under a residual exception absent specific legislation. Justice Lemmon said,
"Arguably, if the Legislature had enacted an 'omnibus' hearsay exception such as Fed.
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is offered by the defendant? While a residual exception could be utilized
unfairly by the prosecution, denying the defendant use of hearsay not
falling under an established exception may "amount to a denial of due
process if the declarant is unavailable and the evidence is reasonably
reliable. "4
The supreme court in Gremillion realized that in balancing the
defendant's constitutional rights against the State's interest in excluding
unreliable evidence, the rule against hearsay must, in some cases, yield
to constitutional concerns. Certainly, the more reliable the evidence, the
more the scale tips in favor of admissibility. But the question remains:
what quantum of reliability and/or necessity is required to render the
evidence "reasonably reliable?" This writer believes that in Gremillion,
where hearsay evidence was admitted pursuant to constitutional principles
of "fairness," rather than under evidentiary principles, the threshold of
reliability required for admission fluctuates-and may even be lowered
further than in Gremillion-depending upon how critical the evidence
is to the defendant's defense. Thus, where the hearsay is the only evidence
the defendant offers to exculpate himself, as Gremillion attempted to
do by introducing Dupuy's statement, the critical nature of the evidence,
rather than its reliability, is the deciding factor that determines admis-
sibility.
In Gremillion, tension existed between the state evidentiary rule
against hearsay and Gremillion's constitutional right to present a defense.
This tension will not be reduced in future cases because the Louisiana
Supreme Court did not articulate distinct and separate standards ap-
plicable to evidentiary admissions and to constitutional admissions. The
court opined that Gremillion's constitutional right to present a defense.
mandated that "while the statement does not fit into any of the rec-
ognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, it should have, nevertheless, been
admitted into evidence due to its reliability and trustworthy nature.""
The court further compounded the confusion by defining reliability and
trustworthiness according to the guidelines established in the civilly-
limited residual exception, an evidentiary standard, instead of defining
the terms under a constitutional standard.
R. Evid. 803(24) and 804(b)(5), leaving to the courts the perogative [sic] to admit hearsay
not falling within the traditional exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness and reliability, such a statement might qualify as admissible hearsay."
State v. Martin, 458 So. 2d 454, 464 (La. 1984) (Lemmon, J., dissenting). See also
Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 804(B)(6) comment (a); L. Westerfield, Westerfield's Louis-
iana Evidence § 9-42, at 229 (1986).
45. 4 J. Weinstein, supra note 26, at 803-(24)[01], citing Comment, The Criminal
Defendant and Hearsay Evidence: Time for a Change, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 250, 265 (1969)
(emphasis added).
46. State v. Gremillion, 542 So. 2d 1074, 1078 (La. 1989).
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Even if the residual exception for civil cases provided in the Louisiana
Code of Evidence was stretched by a broad reading of Gremillion to
include admissibility of evidence in criminal cases when offered by the
defendant, Dupuy's statement to the police officer should still not have
been admissible under the residual standard. This author believes that
the statement lacked the quantum of reliability required under even the
civil residual exception. The residual civil exception expressly requires
that the court consider all pertinent circumstances in making a deter-
mination as to the statement's trustworthiness. Dupuy's statement lacked
spontaneity, a traditional measure of reliability, and the circumstances
of its utterance indicate that the statement may have been affected by
his emotional and intellectual condition. Having been rendered uncon-
scious during the altercation with Gremillion, Dupuy's perception and
memory may have been distorted as well. Further, Dupuy's sincerity is
questionable; since Dupuy's wife was involved in the barroom incident,
Dupuy's statement may have been motivated by a desire to protect her
from criminal charges. 47
Since the evidence was admitted under a constitutional standard,
although it would not have met an evidentiary standard, the Louisiana
Supreme Court's standard for reliability must be less strenuous under
the constitutional right to present a defense than it is under the residual
exception for civil cases. It should also be noted that had Dupuy's
statement been proffered by the prosecution, it would have been in-
admissible, since the prosecution lacks a right to present evidence that
is correlative to the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense.
Would Dupuy's statement have been admissible under the Federal
Rules of Evidence? Yes, Dupuy's statement would be admitted since it
satisfies the requirements of comparative reliability established by the
Rules residual exception, whether offered by the defendant or by the
prosecution. As discussed earlier, the federal residual exception requires
that the evidence have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness," that its admission is in the interests of justice, and that
it is material and highly probative. Dupuy's statement has characteristics
of reliability that would certainly measure up to some, but not all, of
the recognized hearsay exceptions. 48
V. THE RIGHT To PRESENT A DEFENSE
Evidentiary rules and constitutional safeguards for the criminal de-
fendant do not stand on equal footing. Whereas evidentiary rules focus
47. See generally 4 J. Weinstein, supra note 26, at 1 800[01], for an overview of
the hearsay rule and the problems encountered in analyzing testimonial proof.
48. See lmwinkelried, supra note 15, at 262 ("The hearsay statements admitted under
the orthodox exceptions vary greatly in their reliability."); Weinstein, Evidence Manual,
supra note 16, at 14.04[01] (A lesser showing of trustworthiness is sufficient when
evidence is admitted under Federal Rule 804 rather than 803.).
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on the reliability of the proffered evidence, the constitutional principle
embodied in the right to present a defense "focus[es] judicial attention
on the fairness of the rule ... to the accused." '49 United States Supreme
Court decisions over the last 20 years have indicated that, under certain
circumstances, the constitutional right to place relevant evidence before
the trier of fact, in developing a defense, will preempt contrary state
evidentiary rules.
In Gremillion, since Dupuy's statement fell outside the enumerated
hearsay exceptions, including the civilly-limited residual exception, the
hearsay rules would preclude admission of the statement. The Louisiana
Supreme Court, however, ruled that the accused's constitutional right
to present a defense, as embodied in Louisiana Constitution Article I,
Section 16, overrode the absence of an applicable hearsay exception,
citing as authority the case of Chambers v. Mississippi, among others.
Chambers v. Mississippi, which broke new constitutional ground, is
essential in a discussion concerning the relationship between evidentiary
principles and constitutional guarantees." In Chambers, the Supreme
Court ruled that denying the defendant's right to present three witnesses
who would exculpate him, even though such evidence was inadmissible
under Mississippi evidentiary rules,5 2 was a violation of the defendant's
right to due process under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. The
Court stated, "The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process
is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
State's accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses
in one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due
process." 3
This decision paved the way for the constitutionally-mandated ad-
mission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay offered by a criminal defendant
despite Justice Powell's admonishment that the Court did not intend
creation of new principles of constitutional law."' Consequently, the
Chambers decision has forced courts to admit critical evidence that state
evidentiary laws would have prohibited. 5  The Chambers Court succinctly
49. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee
In Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 711, 797 (1976) [hereinafter Clinton].
50. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973).
51. See generally Churchwell, The Constitutional Right to Present Evidence: Progeny
of Chambers v. Mississippi, 19 Crim. L. Bull. 131 (1983) [hereinafter Churchwell]; Clinton,
supra note 49; Pugh & McClelland, Evidence, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1973-74 Term, 35 La. L. Rev. 525, 544 (1975).
52. Mississippi did not recognize the declaration against penal interest as an exception
to the hearsay rule. A second issue in Chambers involved the unconstitutionality of
Mississippi's "voucher rule" as applied under the circumstances. The discussion of that
issue is beyond the scope of this note.
53. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294, 93 S. Ct. at 1045.
54. Id. at 303, 93 S. Ct. at 1049.
55. Churchwell, supra note 51, at 139.
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defined the relationship between the hearsay and the accused's consti-
tutional guarantees: "In these circumstances, where constitutional rights
directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay
rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.' '56
Chambers, as well as its predecessors and progeny," recognize that
the right to present a defense is an essential feature of the defendant's
right to a fair trial.5" But how far does the right to present a defense
extend? Is it a quantifiable guarantee? Specifically, what evidence must
be admitted under the right to present a defense? Certainly, not all the
56. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 303, 93 S. Ct. at 1049.
57. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S. Ct. 1920 (1967). Although
the issue in Washington was based on the narrower right of compulsory process, it is
significant in that the unconstitutionally excluded testimony lacked any particular indicia
of reliability. Defendant had the right to compel the attendance of a witness whose
testimony would have been favorable to him despite a state statute which "arbitrarily"
denied him the right. As with the right to present a defense, compulsory process is not
without its parameters; compulsory process does not embrace such "rights" as finding
missing witnesses or paying for defense witnesses at government expense. See B. Schwartz,
Constitutional Law § 7.13 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter Schwartz]; State v. Vaughn, 448 So.
2d 1260, 1262 (La. 1983) (On original hearing the court stated that a rule of evidence
"cannot be mechanistically applied to deny admission of highly reliable and relevant
evidence critical to an accused's defense." On rehearing, the statement regarding the rape
complainant's reputation was excluded as irrelevant.); State v. Jones, 363 So. 2d 455,
457 (La. 1978) (Defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to compel the attendance
of witnesses and "in some measure" of his constitutional right to present a defense when
co-perpetrator, who had not invoked the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, did not testify based on fear of reprisal.); State v. Browning, 290 So. 2d 322
(La. 1974), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, supra note 51, at 545 (If defendant had
succeeded in "lay[ing] a predicate sufficiently linking a third person to the crime in
question, Chambers v. Mississippi might well have necessitated a relaxation of traditional
evidentiary rules."); State v. Drumgo, 283 So. 2d 463, 469 (La. 1973) (The Louisiana
Supreme Court upheld a decision prohibiting defense counsel from questioning defense
witness, a police officer, regarding description of armed robbers by other complainants.
Although the trial court's decision was grounded in irrelevancy and immateriality, hearsay
was also implied as a basis for the ruling. The court stated, "Perhaps in different
circumstances [where fairness and reason dictate] we would not find strict adherence to
the hearsay rule required. However, in the instant case we do not find that the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding the hearsay testimony sought by defense counsel.");
State v. Rabbas, 278 So. 2d 45, 47 (La. 1972) (The Louisiana Supreme Court ordered a
new trial on other grounds, but, in dicta, stated that the defendant's right to introduce
evidence in support of his defense of entrapment should, in the future, carefully consider
Chambers v. Mississippi.). Cf. State v. Smith, 400 So. 2d 587 (La. 1981) (Hearsay testimony
of a witness regarding a third party's confession which would exculpate the defendant
was not a violation of the defendant's right to present a defense where the declarant's
unavailability was not shown and the statement did not qualify as a declaration against
penal interest.). See generally W. Freedman, The Constitutional Right to a Speedy and
Fair Criminal Trial 17 (1989) (The defendant may only introduce evidence that is "material
and favorable to his defense.").
58. Clinton, supra note 49, at 857. See generally Schwartz, supra note 57, at § 7.12.
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evidentiary rules that limit the defendant's introduction of evidence in
his behalf are "unconstitutional obstructions."1 9 Some commentators
have interpreted Chambers to allow the defendant a fair opportunity to
defend against the State's accusations by developing "all available, rea-
sonably reliable evidence in his defense.' ' 6 Others have read Chambers
more broadly, stating that "even where the defendant is prevented from
developing only a single piece of evidence in his defense, no one but
the trier of fact can say whether the additional bit of evidence in
conjunction with the other evidence would have been sufficient to ex-
culpate the defendant."'" Still other commentators interpret Chambers
narrowly, holding only that a defendant in a criminal case cannot be
convicted without any defense. 62 These views can be reconciled by fo-
cusing on the critical nature of the evidence: where the evidence is
critical to the accused's defense, as where it is the only exculpatory
evidence available, hearsay evidence that lacks even "extrinsic indicia
of reliability might be constitutionally compelled. ' 63 This result is rooted
in the very concept of a fair and impartial trial. Thus, as under the
residual exception, courts must proceed on an ad hoc basis when de-
termining if otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence is admissible under
the constitutional right to present a defense-as guaranteed by the sixth
and fourteenth amendments. Rather than focusing exclusively on the
reliability of the hearsay statement, the courts should focus on the
interests protected by the accused's right to present a defense. 64
In achieving this focus, the Chambers Court and subsequent cases
employed a balancing test to determine the admissibility of evidence,
with the outcome dependent on the subtle facts and circumstances of
each case. However, if the hearsay possesses a minimum of reliability,
the question then becomes, is justice better served by its admission or
its exclusion?6" The Louisiana Supreme Court answered this question in
59. Clinton, supra note 49, at 793.
60. Schwartz, supra note 57, at § 7.15 (Even allowing legislative authority over rules
of evidence, the defendant in a criminal trial has a due process right to introduce "any
evidence" so long as it is competent, relevant, and material.); Comment, Chambers v.
Mississippi: The Limits of Due Process-The "Voucher" Rule and the Exception for
Hearsay Declarations Against Interest, 4 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 191, 206 (1974)
[hereinafter Chambers v. Mississippi: The Limits of Due Process].
61. Chambers v. Mississippi: The Limits of Due Process, supra note 60, at 205-06.
62. Note, Chambers v. Mississippi: Due Process and the Rules of Evidence, 35 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 725, 738 (1974). But see Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 100, 99 S. Ct.
2150, 2152 (1979) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[Tihe United States Constitution must
be strained to or beyond the breaking point to conclude that all capital defendants who
are unable to introduce all of the evidence which they seek to admit are denied a fair
trial.").
63. Clinton, supra note 49, at 809.
64. Id. at 807.
65. Lempert, supra note 41, at 506.
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Gremillion, finding justice better served by admission of evidence. This
results from the supreme court's finding that the proffered evidence
must, at the very least, possess relevancy and, at most, some reliability. 66
The question of how much reliability is needed is unanswered.
Although the redactors of the Louisiana Code of Evidence chose
to keep constitutional and evidentiary standards separate, 67 the Gremillion
decision confuses these issues. The Gremillion court may have stretched
the residual exception beyond its limits, reading into that case indicia
of reliability that, from an objective examination of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the utterance of Dupuy's statement, were
lacking. Gremillion may be interpreted as establishing a threshold of
reliability and necessity under the residual exception that parallels the
threshold for constitutionally mandated admission established by Cham-
bers and its progeny.6 As discussed earlier, the evidentiary standard of
66. See supra note 57. See also State v. Ludwig, 423 So. 2d 1073, 1079 (La. 1982)
(Defendant, on trial for murder, attempted to introduce police report and testimony of
police officer regarding the fact that victim's wife had shot victim six months earlier,
thus inferring that victim's wife, rather than defendant, was guilty. The Louisiana Supreme
Court stated, "[State and Federal constitutional guarantees do not, however, require a
trial court to permit introduction of evidence that is irrelevant or which has so little
probative value that it is substantially outweighed by other legitimate considerations in
the administration of justice."); State v. Glaze, 439 So. 2d 605 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983)
(In dicta, the first circuit stated that an exculpatory statement made to police officer
during custodial interrogation was of slight probative value and thus denying admissibility
did not violate defendant's right to present a defense.).
67. La. Code Evid. art. 102 comment (b).
The rules and procedures embodied in the Articles of this Code do not represent
an attempt to interpret the Federal or Louisiana constitution. Constitutional
questions should be resolved by the principles and rules of constitutional law.
[Citations omitted] In criminal matters especially the Articles of this Code must
be interpreted and applied in light of and within the confines mandated by the
Louisiana and federal constitutions.
68. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S. Ct. 2150 (1979) (Defendant sought to
introduce witness's testimony at a sentencing hearing that co-defendant had admitted he
killed the victim while defendant was on an errand. The Court found the evidence reliable,
due to circumstances surrounding its utterance. The United States Supreme Court gave
weight to the fact that the state had found the witness's testimony sufficiently reliable
to support the co-defendant's conviction.); State v. Webb, 424 So. 2d 233 (La. 1982)
(Two men were accused of murder and the pretrial hearing indicated that the co-defendant's
defense was based on lack of specific intent. Under such circumstances, denial of motion
to sever impaired defendant's right to present a defense, where motion made by co-
defendant inured to other's benefit. A second violation of the right to present a defense
occurred when co-defendant was not permitted to cross-examine police detective regarding
the other defendant's confession, from which evidence the jury could have inferred a lack
of intent.); State v. Washington, 386 So. 2d 1368, 1373 (La. 1980) (The constitutional
violation occurred when evidence was declared inadmissible, not on the basis of hearsay,
but on the grounds of relevancy. Defendant, on trial for rape, was prohibited from
interrogating prosecution witness concerning other child rapes in the area, violating his
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reliability should continue to require a showing of trustworthiness that
is higher than that established under the balancing test for constitutional
admissions.
Simply stated, if Gremillion establishes the standard of trustwor-
thiness under the constitutional right to present a defense, the standards
for evidentiary and constitutionally mandated admission of "trustwor-
thy" evidence will be impermissibly merged into one standard. That is
because the Gremillion court used an evidentiary standard, the civil
exception, to evaluate a constitutional principle, the right to present a
defense. Therefore, what would have been admitted under a constitu-
tional standard of trustworthiness will now be excluded by the more
rigorous evidentiary standard found in the residual exception. This result
is the very one the redactors of the Louisiana Code sought to avoid
by not codifying a residual exception applicable in criminal cases. Al-
though the Gremillion court may not have desired such a result, the
Louisiana Supreme Court's reference to Article 804B(6), 69 and the ap-
parent weighing of Dupuy's statement using the residual evidentiary
scale, has created the possibility for this interpretation of the decision
at the lower court level.
VI. STATE v. GREmmmoN: ANALYSIS
A. Applying Chambers to Gremillion
Generally, where evidentiary and constitutional principles clash, the
latter will prevail. However, it may be unclear whether a particular
decision is based on constitutional or evidentiary principles. For example,
Justice Powell's opinion in Chambers did not state whether that decision
was rooted in constitutional or evidentiary principles, 70 although the
substantial emphasis placed on assuring the reliability of the hearsay
evidence7 might suggest evidentiary principles. Regardless, Chambers
was constitutionally sound. The mechanistic application of a hearsay
exclusionary rule, where the defendant sought to admit evidence critical
to his defense, i.e. the confession of another to the crime for which
the defendant was on trial, and where the declarant was available for
cross-examination, violated a basic tenet of constitutional law-the right
to a fair trial. 72
constitutional right to present a defense. The Louisiana Supreme Court characterized such
a situation as "fundamentally unfair.").
69. State v. Gremillion, 542 So. 2d. 1074, 1078 (La. 1989).
70. Clinton, supra note 49, at 787.
71. Id.
72. See Id. at 792 (Chambers' holding is a "ringing endorsement of the right to
defend."); See also Churchwell, supra note 51.
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It is likewise unclear whether the Gremillion decision is based on
constitutional or evidentiary standards. The basis of the decision is
important as it defines the scope of the holding, of which there are
three possibilities: (1) Article 804B(6) allows the introduction of evidence
in a criminal trial both by the prosecution and the defense, if the
statement meets the criteria established in the decision; 73 (2) otherwise
inadmissible hearsay, may be admitted by the defendant in a criminal
trial, only if denial of admission would infringe upon the defendant's
constitutional right to present a defense; or (3) evidence admitted pur-
suant to (2) requires reliability and necessity as measured by Article
804B(6), as opposed to a constitutional standard.
Although the court cited the constitutional right to present a defense
as the impetus for its decision, the Gremillion court, as did the Chambers
Court, focused on assessing the reliability and the trustworthiness of
the evidence. In Chambers, the United States Supreme Court, faced
with Mississippi's lack of a hearsay exception for a declaration against
penal interest, devoted much of the decision to an explanation of the
requirements of the newly created exception and the application of the
exception to the proffered evidence. 74 In Gremillion, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court was faced with a different problem-the lack of a residual
exception in criminal cases. The Gremillion court focused on comment
(d) to Article 804B(6), which states:
Although the exception set forth in this Subparagraph is limited
to civil cases, under certain circumstances results similar to those
authorized by this exception may be mandated by the right of
compulsory process when an accused in a criminal case offers
reliable trustworthy evidence not fitting within the contours of
a legislatively recognized exception to the hearsay rule."
Thus, both Gremillion and Chambers measured the reliability of the
proffered statements against unenacted hearsay exceptions. 76 The Grem-
73. See State v, Gremillion, 542 So. 2d 1074, 1080 (La. 1989) (Marcus, J., dissenting).
Justice Marcus interpreted Gremillion as extending the Article 804B(6) residual exception
to criminal cases, questioning "the majority's conclusion that the statement ... was
admissible under La. Code of Evidence, article 804B(6)." Most likely in response to
Justice Marcus' conclusion, Justice Lemmon stressed in his concurring opinion that Grem-
illion was an unusual case which "necessitate[d] an exception to the usual rules of evidence
on the basis of the Louisiana constitutional right to present a defense," a right unavailable
to the state. Id. at 1079 (Lemmon, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
74. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299-301, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1047-1049 (1973).
75. La. Code Evid. art. 804B(6) comment (d) is didactic in nature and does not have
the force of law (citations omitted).
76. In Chambers, Mississippi did not recognize a hearsay exception for declaration
against penal interest. In Gremillion, Louisiana does not recognize a residual exception
to the hearsay rule in criminal cases.
[Vol. 50
NOTES
illion court used the comment as authority, attempting to apply the
residual exception to Dupuy's statement.
The Chambers and Gremillion decisions are similar in several re-
spects. In Gremillion, as in Chambers, the dispute centered around a
state evidentiary rule rendering the hearsay evidence inadmissible. In
both decisions the right of the defendant to present a defense was also
an issue. Further, in both cases, the defendant was not prevented from
calling the witness, but the testimony he sought to introduce from that
witness was excluded as hearsay. The Gremillion court followed Cham-
bers in holding that, while the state evidentiary rule at issue was itself
constitutional, the application of the evidentiary rule violated the de-
fendant's right to present a defense under the specific circumstances of
the case. 77
In Chambers, the proffered evidence was deemed trustworthy enough
to admit under the due process right to present a defense. The Court
considered that the evidence was (1) necessary to Chambers' defense,
(2) reliable due to its spontaneity and self-incriminating nature, (3)
corroborated by three witnesses, and (4) the declarant was in court and
available for cross-examination.7 8 Of these four factors, the Court at-
tributed the most significance to the declarant's availability for cross-
examination. 79 Each of these four elements will be examined as they
relate to the Gremillion decision.
1. Necessity
The evidence Gremillion sought to establish was critical to his de-
fense. However, unlike in Chambers, the evidence in Gremillion was
not totally withheld from the jury on the basis of hearsay objections.
The statement describing Dupuy's description of his attackers as "three
white males" was put before the jury on three different occasions. First,
the trial court permitted the victim's hospital records, which contained
the victim's statement to his physician that he had been beaten and
kicked by "several others," to be read into evidence by the medical
expert.10 Second, the objection by the State to the police officer's tes-
timony regarding Dupuy's statement was raised after the statement had
been heard by the jury. The jury was later instructed to disregard the
statement. Finally, defense counsel, in closing arguments, referred to
77. See, e.g., Chambers, 410 U.S. at 303, 93 S. Ct. at 1049; Gremillion, 542 So.
2d at 1078.
78. Chambers v. Mississippi-The Limits of Due Process, supra note 60, at 203.
79. Id.
80. State v. Gremillion, 542 So. 2d 1074, 1077 (La. 1989) (Dupuy's treating physician
testified from his records, reciting Dupuy's statement to the jury. The Louisiana Supreme
Court acknowledged the "hearsay nature" of the statement.).
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the statement.8' As Justice Watson articulated in his dissent, defense
counsel admitted that "the jury was well aware of the 'three white
males' theory of defense." ' a2
2. Reliability
The reliability of Dupuy's statement is neither as high as the majority
suggests nor as low as the dissent maintains. The majority opinion
considered factors intrinsic and extrinsic to the hearsay statement in
assessing its reliability, an evidentiary procedure suggested by Article
804B(6). a3 Yet, if the statement was admitted pursuant to a constitutional
standard, the use of an evidentiary standard to evaluate the statement's
reliability was inappropriate.
In assessing the reliability of the evidence, the court considered the
relationship between the speaker, Dupuy, and the recipient, the police
officer, implicitly suggesting that: (1) Dupuy had no motive to lie to
the police officer investigating the incident; and (2) the police officer,
who was trained in questioning crime victims, was not likely to mis-
interpret or inaccurately remember the statement.8 4
The court considered it noteworthy that the victim, although lacking
an apparent desire to protect Gremillion from prosecution, failed to
identify Gremillion as the culprit to either the police officer or admitting
physician, despite the fact that Dupuy and Gremillion were close friends.85
Finally, it was possible that Dupuy could have received the fatal injuries
between the time of his confrontation with Gremillion at the bar and
the time he admitted himself to the hospital, eight hours later.
Hence, the court, in evaluating the statement, considered the rela-
tionship between Dupuy and the police officer, Dupuy's motivation and
credibility, the circumstances under which the statement was made, Du-
puy's first-hand knowledge, the lapse of time between the event and
the uttering of the statement, and the consistency of Dupuy's behavior
with the statement. The court found a sufficient quantum of reliability
to merit admission-an amount greater than that inherent in the simple
making of the statement, but less than an absolute guarantee of reli-
ability.
Justice Lemmon, in his concurring opinion, emphasized that the
statement "nearly qualifie[d]" as a declaration against pecuniary in-
81. Id. at 1080 (Watson, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § I at Article 804B(6) original comment (c).
84. Gremillion, 542 So. 2d. at 1078.
85. Id. The majority maintained that there was no support in the record for the
state's contention that Dupuy's friendship with Gremillion was a factor in Dupuy's failure
to identify the defendant as his attacker. Id. at 1079.
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terest,8 6 thus finding the statement reliable. Contrary to Justice Lemmon's
assurance that the statement "could not have been more trustworthy
and reliable,' '87 Justice Watson urged in his dissent that there was "not
a shred of evidence""8 to support Gremillion's theory that Dupuy was
attacked by "three white males." The dissent questioned the reliability
of the evidence, noting that although Gremillion denied stomping Dupuy,
his testimony was contradicted by the eyewitness testimony of three
disinterested observers. 9 This author finds Justice Watson's reasoning
more persuasive, primarily because one indicator of reliability-spon-
taneity-was lacking in Dupuy's statement. Additionally, while the ma-
jority stated that Dupuy lacked a motive to lie, they glossed over the
fact that Dupuy and Gremillion had been long-time acquaintances. Thus,
Dupuy could have been motivated by a misguided sense of loyalty or
even a desire to seek redress on his own. Further, Dupuy also knew
Swain, owed Swain money, and argued with Swain the night of the
incident at the bar. Yet, Dupuy did not identify his attackers, nor
describe their clothing. If Dupuy was attacked by Swain and his two
friends, as Gremillion maintained, then why did Dupuy fail to identify
Swain as his attacker? The court failed to address this question. This
unanswered question weighs on the side of the evidence's unreliability.
3. Corroboration
The majority opinion emphasized that Dupuy's statement to the
police officer regarding the "three white males" was corroborated by
his statement to the admitting physician that he was attacked by "several
others." The majority downplayed the differences in the two statements,
stating that although the two statements were not identical, "they [were]
similar in nature since in neither one did Dupuy specifically identify the
defendant."9
The court's reasoning is problematical in that there is no evidence
that the "several others" referred to in one statement are the same
"three white males" described in the other statement. Evidence was
presented at the trial that Dupuy, after being knocked unconscious by
Gremillion, was also kicked by his former wife, Gremillion's companion.
The possibility exists, then, that the "several others" to which Dupuy
86. Id. at 1079 n.l (Lemmon, J., concurring). A statement against pecuniary interest
is defined in La. Code Evid. art. 804B(3), in its pertinent part, as "[a] statement which
was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary ... interest
... or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true."
87. Id. at 1079.
88. Id. at 1080 (Watson, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1079 (Watson, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1077.
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referred were actually Gremillion and Dupuy's former wife. This is at
least as plausible as Gremillion's contention.
4. Declarant's (Un)availability
While the Chambers court relied heavily on the declarant's availa-
bility for cross-examination in admitting the evidence, in Gremillion the
declarant, Dupuy, was unavailable. 9' In Gremillion, then, the need for
the evidence was greater than in Chambers, as there was no way to
admit the evidence other than as hearsay. The residual exception im-
plicitly recognizes the correlative relationship between necessity andre-
liability or trustworthiness. Where the reliability of evidence is high, the
quantum of necessity required for admission of the evidence can be
correspondently lower. However, where, as in Gremillion, the reliability
of the evidence is low, then the necessity must be correspondingly higher.
Finally where the need far outweighs reliability, as this writer maintains
occurred in Gremillion, the court's analysis is more proper under the
constitutional right to present a defense.
B. Gremillion's Constitutional Balancing Test
This author believes, based on the previous analysis, that the Louis-
iana Supreme Court used a constitutional basis in deciding Gremillion,
stretching the evidentiary standards of reliability, trustworthiness, and
necessity enunciated in Article 804B(6) to determine if the evidence
satisfied the threshold for admissibility. The decision would have been
more persuasive if the court had more clearly applied a balancing test,
balancing the defendant's interests in introducing the exculpatory evi-
dence against the State's interest in assuring the integrity of the evidence.
In the balancing equation, the more critical the nature of the evidence,
the less reliable it would need to be to satisfy the threshold of admission.
Under this equation, Dupuy's statement would have satisfied the lower
threshold of reliability established under the right to present a defense.
Thus, Gremillion's need for the evidence, along with the traditional
considerations of fairness toward the criminal defendant, would outweigh
the State's interest in excluding unreliable evidence, and the statement
would be admissible.
In the balancing equation, a residual criminal exception under Federal
Rule 805(b)(5) may be superfluous when used to admit evidence by the
defendant. If the hearsay evidence is inadmissible under the traditional
91. The definition of unavailability includes exemption due to privilege, refusal to
testify, testifying to a lack of memory, death, illness, or absence if the declarant's testimony
can not be procured by reasonable means. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(a) and La. Code Evid.
art. 804A.
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exceptions, and lacks the equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness mandated by Rule 804(b)(5), it cannot be admitted under
any federal evidentiary rule. The evidence, however, could be introduced
under the defendant's right to present a defense. Thus, if the evidence
satisfies the residual exception, a higher standard, it would also auto-
matically satisfy the lesser standard of reliability mandated by the right
to present a defense. Because evidence critical to the defendant's defense
theory will be admitted under the right to present a defense, a residual
criminal exception should be unnecessary. Further, eliminating the federal
residual exception for criminal cases where the declarant is unavailable
would also safeguard the defendant's right to confrontation. Whether
such confrontation clause challenges are justified will be discussed in
the following section.
The same argument, however, cannot be made for the Louisiana
residual exception. Because that exception recognizes the distinction be-
tween constitutional and evidentiary standards, and has established a
standard of trustworthiness and reliability that is more rigorous than
its federal counterpart, the constitutional and evidentiary standards for
admissibility stand on more distinct planes. This is the reason that the
residual exception in Louisiana is applicable only to civil cases-i.e.
cases in which the constitutional right to present a defense is not a
consideration. Thus, although evidence that satisfies the Article 804B(6)
evidentiary standard also meets the lower constitutional threshold for
admissibility, the opposite is not necessarily true. Evidence admitted
under the constitutional right to present a defense would not necessarily
meet the Article 804B(6) standard of reliability, which is a higher stan-
dard. The redactors of the Louisiana Code of Evidence were careful to
keep these principles separate, 92 and it is hoped that Gremillion will not
stand as authority for the merger of the two principles.
The Louisiana Code of Evidence is superior to the Federal Rules
of Evidence in protecting the criminal defendant, because the Louisiana
Code prohibits admission of evidence against a criminal defendant unless
it falls within a non-residual exception. But it is not clear if such
protection is necessary. Although the Federal Rules have a residual
criminal exception, it is not often utilized for that purpose, perhaps
fearing confrontation clause challenges. 93 The following section will ex-
plore whether or not such fears are justified. This note will then conclude
with a suggestion to amend Louisiana Code of Evidence article 804B(6)
92. See supra note 67.
93. See Stern, The Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule: A Reappraisal, 13 Colo.
Law. 1818, 1823 (1984) ("[T]he National Institute of Trial Advocacy has confirmed that
hearsay evidence is only infrequently admitted under FRE Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5).")
(footnote omitted).
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to permit hearsay evidence when it is offered by the defendant in a
criminal case, a recommendation based on maintaining the critical bal-
ance between the prosecution and defense, which balance characterizes
the criminal trial process. 94
VII. RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
The redactors of the Louisiana Code of Evidence sought to avoid
confrontation clause problems by limiting the residual exception to civil
cases. In this section, this note will explore whether that fear was
justified, and further, the results of reading Gremillion as Justice Marcus
did in his dissent: as authority for applying Article 804B(6) to criminal
cases whether the evidence is offered by or against the defendant. 9
The right to confrontation, 6 recognized nearly 100 years after the
hearsay rule was woven into the judicial fabric, 97 has always allowed
certain hearsay exceptions to transcend its guarantee, 9s despite the ban
against all hearsay that would result from a literal application of the
confrontation clause. If the defendant's right to confront his accusers
at the trial was absolute, then no hearsay statement, regardless of its
purported reliability, need, or relevance, would be admissible against
the defendant.
Although the right to confrontation and the hearsay rule were con-
ceived in a spirit of fairness to the criminal defendant, they remain,
because of their different functions, "similar but distinct." 99 The right
94. For an explanation of why the balance of advantage lies with the state in criminal
cases, see generally Lempert, supra note 41, at 521.
95. State v. Gremillion, 542 So. 2d 1074, 1080 (La. 1989) (Marcus, J., dissenting).
96. U.S. Const. amend. VI states in its pertinent part, "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.";
see also La. Const. art. I, § 16.
97. The sixth amendment was ratified in 1789. However, the actual right to con-
frontation dates from early Western legal culture and may have existed even under Roman
Law. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800 (1988).
98. See Schwartz, supra note 57, at § 7.14; see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
63, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (1980).
99. See J. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused § 18:12 (1986) [hereinafter
Cook]; see Epps, Passing the Confrontation Clause Stop Sign: Is All Hearsay Consti-
tutionally Admissible?, 77 Kent. L. J. 7, 11 (1988); Lilly, supra note 14, at 213 (The
confrontation clause is not simply the embodiment of the hearsay rule); see also Dutton
v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86, 91 S. Ct. 210, 218 (1970) (plurality opinion) ("It seems
apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay
rule stem from the same roots. But this Court has never equated the two, and we decline
to do so now. [footnotes omitted]"); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 1930
(1970). The overlap between the confrontation clause and hearsay rules is not complete.
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to confrontation may require the court to override federal or state
evidentiary rules and policies designed to limit hearsay. I°° Although the
hearsay rule may be satisfied in a particular case, the right to con-
frontation may not, and conversely, satisfaction of the confrontation
clause does not immunize evidence from a hearsay challenge.'01 Prac-
ticaly speaking, however, once the evidence qualifies under a hearsay
exception, it is rarely excluded by a confrontation clause challenge.10 2
Further, the right to confrontation is not absolute and, as the Court
recognized in Chambers, "may, in appropriate cases, bow to accom-
modate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process."'0 3
In grappling with the uneasy relationship between the hearsay rule
and confrontation clause guarantees, the redactors of the Louisiana Code
of Evidence recognized the separateness of the two principles.'04 Louis-
iana decisions concerning the confrontation clause have paralleled federal
interpretations.105 For example, in State v. Collier, the Louisiana First
Circuit Court of Appeal stated that the confrontation clause guarantees
that
The Court in Green stated that,
[W]e have more than once found a violation of confrontation values even though
the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay
exception. [citations omitted] The converse is equally true: merely because ev-
idence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead
to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied [footnote
omitted].
Id. at 155-56, 90 S. Ct. 1934.
100. Rothstein, supra note 13, at 182 (The United States Constitution can override
particular applications of the FRE). See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct.
1105 (1974) (State policy protecting the identities of juvenile offenders fell within ambit
of the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation where defendant wished to cross-
examine witness to reveal probationary status and possible bias. The right to confrontation
also includes the opportunity to cross-examine.).
101. See, e.g., Green, 399 U.S. at 156, 90 S. Ct. at 1934; Weinstein, Evidence Manual,
supra note 16, at § 14.03, at 14-15.
102. McCormick, supra note 37, at §§ 252, 752.
103. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S..Ct. 1038, 1046 (1973).
104. Both the federal and Louisiana rules of evidence chose to leave constitutional
interpretation to the judiciary, respecting judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation.
See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972);
La. Code Evid. art. 102 comment (b).
105. The Louisiana courts have interpreted the rights granted by article I, section 16
as interchangeable with those granted under the sixth amendment. Note, Hearsay and The
Confrontation Guaranty, 38 La. L. Rev. 858, 859 (1978). See, e.g., State v. Rankin, 465
So. 2d 679, 681 (La. 1985), where the court stated,
The defendant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, found in the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, is a fundamental right and
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment ... [T]his right to
confrontation is found in the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.
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before hearsay is used against an accusedi there must be suf-
ficient indicia of reliabilityas to the statement, the prosecution
must have made a good faith effort to obtain the declarant at
trial; and, where possible, the defendant must be provided with
an adequate opportunity to fully and fairly cross-examine the
witness against him.' °6
Similarly, Louisiana courts are unlikely to find a violation of the
confrontation clause where the hearsay is admitted under a recognized
exception, °7 or where the statute creating an exception to the confron-
tation clause guarantees "procedurally accommodate(s) the competing
interests ... involved."'108 The decisions also clearly indicate that the
courts will not hesitate to exclude otherwise admissible hearsay upon
finding a constitutional violation.' °9
In Gremillion, because the proponent of the evidence was the de-
fendant, the supreme court had no occasion to consider the applicability
of the confrontation clause. Nevertheless, the holding may impact the
confrontation right if the lower courts construe Gremillion as expanding
Article 804B(6) to encompass evidence offered by the prosecution or
the defense. The question then to consider is whether Dupuy's statement
would violate the confrontation clause if the proponent of the evidence
was the prosecution rather than the defense.
In answering this question, one must consider Ohio v. Roberts."0
There, the United States Supreme Court ruled that there was no violation
of the right to confrontation where the introduction of the unavailable
witness's prior testimony bore an "indicia of reliability," due to the
cross-examination of the witness at a previous hearing. The Court said,
"Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence
106. 522 So. 2d 584, 592 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 553 So.
2d 815 (1989). See also State v. Cade, 539 So. 2d 650 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989); State
v. Monroe, 345 So. 2d 1185, 1189 (La. 1977).
107. See, e.g., State v. Nix, 327 So. 2d 301, 332 (La. 1975). The court found no
confrontation clause violation where evidence was admitted pursuant to res gestae exception
to the hearsay rule. The court stated, "We find the case remarkably similar to the Dutton
case ... in which the United States Supreme Court found no violation of defendants'
right to confrontation."
108. State v. Roberts, 533 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988). The court did
not find that Coy v. Iowa precluded all exceptions to the confrontation clause. But, said
the court, 'if there is to be an exception to the exercise of these fundamental rights, it
must be created by a statute designed to procedurally accommodate the competing interests
which are involved .... "
109. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 428 So. 2d 438, 442 (La. 1983), in which the court
stated that "all evidence, regardless of the rule under which it is admitted, is subject to
constitutional guarantees of due process and a fair trial before an impartial jury."
110. 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980).
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must be excluded, absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." ' l The test of admissibility is thus met one of two
ways: either a showing that the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception or that the evidence possesses "particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness."
More recently, in United States v. Inadi,1" 2 the United States Supreme
Court held that neither cross-examination nor personal presence of the
witness is indispensable to satisfying the confrontation clause. In Inadi,
however, the reliability of the statement was not at issue." 3 Rather, the
sole issue before the Court was whether the confrontation clause requires
a demonstration of unavailability to admit statements of a non-testifying
co-conspirator. The Court held that where the statements satisfied Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)," 4 and where the burden imposed by
requiring a showing of unavailability was substantial, and the benefits
slight, the confrontation clause did not require a showing of unavail-
ability.
Finally, in Bourjaily v. United States,"5 the Inadi holding regarding
the satisfaction of the confrontation clause where the non-testifying co-
conspirator's statements were admitted against the defendant was upheld.
The United States Supreme Court stated that the confrontation clause
does not require an independent indication of reliability. Rather, in
determining if the evidence meets the Roberts requirement of a "firmly
rooted hearsay exception," the first test, the Court must "see how
'firmly rooted' the exception is." That inquiry suggested to the majority
that the exception must be "steeped in our jurisprudence,"" 1 6 and to
the dissent "that, through experience in its use, the exception has proved
to promote the 'accuracy of the factfinding process.""' 7
This writer believes that Dupuy's statement would not survive a
confrontation clause challenge. First, the residual exception can hardly
11I. Id. at 66, 100 S. Ct. at 2359.
112. 475 U.S. 387, 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986).
113. Id. at 391 n.3, 106 S. Ct. at 1124 n.3. Weinstein suggests that Inadi limits Roberts
to when the declarant is unavailable. Weinstein thus maintains that Roberts applies to
Federal Rule 804 but probably not to 803. Weinstein, Evidence Manual, supra note 16,
at 14.03[02] n.8.
114. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) excludes from the definition of hearsay "a statement
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
115. 438 U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
116. Id. at 183, 107 S. Ct. at 2783.
117. Id. at 200, 107 S. Ct. at 2791 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Weinstein states that,
Bourjaily suggests that statements admitted pursuant to [FREI 803 exceptions,
which all hinge on reliability, would automatically satisfy the Confrontation
Clause. The need for such statements is much less, however, than in the case
of Rule 804 exceptions grounded on the unavailability of the declarant. Ac-
cordingly, a particularized showing of reliability should be required.
Weinstein, Evidence Manual, supra note 16, at 14.03[021 (footnote omitted).
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be considered a "firmly rooted hearsay exception," such that evidence
falling within its reach would satisfy the criteria advanced in Roberts,
Inadi, and Bourjaily. Although the components of the residual excep-
tion-necessity, reliability, and trustworthiness-are themselves "firmly
rooted" in the Article 804 hearsay exceptions, it would be unpersuasive
to state that the residual exception, an exception that authorizes only
ad hoc determinations and that prohibits the creation of new class
exceptions, is a "firmly rooted hearsay exception." Second, although
Dupuy's statement was reliable enough to meet the constitutional right
to present a defense threshold of admissibility, it falls short of the higher
confrontation clause standard of "particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness." Nothing in Dupuy's statement, other than the fact that it
was made, lends any guarantee of trustworthiness. The statement lacked
spontaneity, the victim's motivation in making the statement was ques-
tionable, and the defendant's testimony was contradicted by three eyew-
itnesses. 11
Nevertheless, evidence that satisfies the residual exception's noncon-
stitutional standard, would satisfy the Roberts requirement of "partic-
ularized guarantees of trustworthiness" because both the Rules and the
Code require some guarantees of trustworthiness. Thus, a residual ex-
ception in a criminal case would rarely violate the defendant's right to
confrontation.' 9 This nearly automatic satisfaction of the confrontation
clause by the residual exception would, however, tread upon the very
right it seeks to protect, rendering the defendant's right to present a
defense "vulnerable to whatever modifications a particular jurisdiction
chose to append as exceptions to the hearsay rule."' 20
Federal courts have thus cautiously applied the federal residual ex-
ception in allowing evidence against the defendant in a criminal trial.'2'
In United States v. Turner,' a United States District Court urged "great
118. See supra text accompanying notes 70-94, Section Vl of this note, for a discussion
concerning the reliability of Dupuy's statement.
119. See, e.g., United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978), discussed in 4
J. Weinstein, supra note 26, at 804(b)(5)[01] (Grand jury testimony admitted pursuant
to Federal Rule 804(b)(5) satisfied the trustworthiness requirement of both the residual
exception and the confrontation clause). But also see Weinstein, Evidence Manual, supra
note 16, at 14.03[03] ("At this time it is not clear to what extent the Supreme Court
would be willing to hold that any statement that satisfies Federal Rule 804 also satisfies
the Confrontation Clause.").
120. Cook, supra note 99, at § 18:12.
121. See generally Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to
Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1965) (Although dated,
the discussion of the relationship between the right to confrontation and the degree of
trustworthiness required for the various hearsay admissions is enlightening.).
122. 475 F. Supp 194, 203 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (Grand jury testimony and sworn written
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caution" in utilizing Federal Rule 804(b)(5) to admit evidence against
the criminal defendant, citing the uncertain relationship between the
confrontation clause and the residual exception. 23 Any amendment to
the Louisiana Code of Evidence residual exception must keep that warn-
ing in mind.
VIII. AMENDING ARTICLE 804B(6)
From the previous discussion, one can appreciate the redactors'
rationale in limiting the residual exception to civil cases. Where the
defendant's life is at stake, it is a matter of fundamental fairness to
deny an unethical prosecutor the opportunity to admit otherwise un-
reliable evidence against a defendant.
However, there is no correlative rationale for not extending the
residual exception to allow evidence when sought to be admitted by the
defendant. As the Louisiana residual exception now stands, it neither
harms nor helps the criminal defendant. This author therefore suggests
amending Article 804B(6) to add the italicized words:
Other exceptions. In a civil case, and in a criminal case when
offered by the defendant, a statement not specifically covered
by any of the foregoing exceptions if the court determines that
considering all pertinent circumstances in the particular case the
statement is trustworthy, and the proponent of the evidence has
adduced or made a reasonable effort to adduce all other ad-
missible evidence to establish the fact to which the proffered
statement relates.
Comment (d) would need to be amended to state:
Admissibility of hearsay evidence when offered by the defendant
under the right to present a defense or the right of compulsory
process will continue to be governed by the constitutional prin-
ciples articulated in Chambers v. Mississippi. The threshold of
admissibility will, in such cases, be determined on constitutional,
rather than evidentiary, grounds.
By amending Article 804B(6) to encompass otherwise reliable and
trustworthy hearsay falling outside of the class exceptions when offered
by the defendant, several positive effects will accrue.
statements of unavailable witness implicating the defendant in cocaine smuggling conspiracy
not admissible by the prosecution under FRE 804(b)(5)).
123. Id. at 200, citing 4 J. Weinstein, supra note 26, at 804(b)(5)[02].
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First, defense counsel, cognizant of the amended article, will have
a visible reminder of an avenue by which he may admit such hearsay
evidence on both nonconstitutional and constitutional grounds. In non-
constitutional areas, Article 804B(6) would occupy an area that, prior
to amendment, was a "no man's land" in which evidence, regardless
of reliability, could not be admitted by the criminal defendant under
the residual exception absent a constitutional basis. In constitutional
areas, the amended article would overlap with the defendant's consti-
tutional right to present a defense. But, as explained previously, because
the standard for admission under Article 804B(6) is more rigorous than
the constitutional standard, the exception would also embrace a plane
of trustworthiness and admissibility not reached by constitutionally man-
dated admissions. The requirement that evidence admitted on noncon-
stitutional grounds meet the rigorous standard of Article 804B(6) would
minimize the possibility of the residual exception swallowing the rule
against hearsay.
This leads to the second advantage, that is, evidence offered by a
criminal defendant that falls short of satisfying the amended Article
804B(6) exception of trustworthiness would, nevertheless, be admissible
if it satisfied the lower threshold of reliability and trustworthiness re-
quired by the constitutional right to present a defense. Consequently,
the defendant's constitutional rights are also safeguarded. Comment (d)
to Article 804B(6), if amended as suggested, would clearly indicate that
the Article 804B(6) residual exception standard and the constitutional
standard are distinct.
Third, although the amendment may be met with resistance by
district attorneys and associated groups, predicated on the fear of un-
predictable rulings regarding admission of evidence under the residual
exception, the requirement of notice in Article 804B(6)1 4 will provide
ample opportunity for prosecutors to prepare for the proffered evidence.
Finally, because the Article 804B(6) exception would still not permit
evidence when offered against a defendant in a criminal trial, the de-
fendant's right to confrontation will be safeguarded. Further, it is very
124. La. Code Evid. art. 804B(6) requires, in pertinent part, that:
[Tihe proponent of the statement [evidence] makes known in writing to the
adverse party and to the court his intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant, sufficiently
in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it. If, under the circumstances of a particular
case, giving this notice was not practicable or failure to give notice is found
by the court to have been excusable, the court may authorize a delayed notice
to be given, and in that event the opposing party is entitled to a recess,
continuance, or other appropriate relief sufficient to enable him to prepare to
meet the evidence.
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unlikely that a court would interpret the clear wording of the amended
article to permit evidence when offered against the criminal defendant.
IX. CONCLUSION
The redactors of the Louisiana Code of Evidence recognized the
distinct standards applicable to constitutional and evidentiary principles.
In codifying the evidentiary standards, the redactors left constitutional
principals untouched. In Gremillion, the Louisiana Supreme Court ex-
ercised its discretion, pursuant to constitutional principles, to admit
exculpatory hearsay evidence falling outside of an established exception,
where such evidence, considering all pertinent circumstances, was deemed
reliable and trustworthy. Although the Gremillion decision was consti-
tutionally sound, the court should have more clearly applied a consti-
tutional balancing test, rather than stretching the Article 804B(6) residual
exception beyond its carefully defined limits.
The Gremillion court borrowed the evidentiary standards set forth
in the Article 804B(6) exception and applied the standards in a consti-
tutional equation. However, since the reliability standard under the
constitutional right to present a defense is less strenuous than that
advanced by the residual exception, the decision, although reaching a
favorable outcome, used an inappropriate route.
Article 804B(6) should be amended to allow evidence meeting the
requisite reliability and trustworthiness standards when offered by the
criminal defendant. The amendment would better define the boundaries
of admissibility of evidence under Article 804B(6) while safeguarding
the defendant's right to confrontation.
Jill Thompson Losch
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